State of Utah v. Terry B. Carlsen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1993
State of Utah v. Terry B. Carlsen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott L. Wyatt; Logan City Prosecutor; Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee.
Terry B. Carlsen; Appellant in Pro Se.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, State of Utah v. Terry B. Carlsen, No. 930501 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5415
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
-vs-
TERRY B. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930501-CA 
Case Type: APPEAL 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE, 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE 
BURTON H. HARRIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
TERRY B. CARLSEN 
Appellant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-6810 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
TNO.-32Q&2L 
FEB 8 1994 
t/' MaryT. Noonan 
' Clerk of the Court 
IN THE UTAH CODRT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
-vs-
TERRY B. CARLSEN, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930501-CA 
Case Type: APPEAL 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE FIRST CIRCUIT 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF CACHE, 
LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT, THE HONORABLE 
BURTON H. HARRIS, JUDGE PRESIDING 
TERRY B. CARLSEN 
Appellant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 752-6810 
SCOTT L. WYATT 
Logan City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Telephone: (801) 750-9807 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
Jurisdictional Statement 1 
Statement of Issues Presented 1-2 
Determinative Laws 2 
Statement of the Case 
A. Nature of the Case 2 
B. Course of Proceedings 2-3 
C. Statement of Facts 3-7 
Summary of Argument 7 
Argument 
Point 1. 
The statute under which the Defendant was 
convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, 
(1953 as amended) is unconstitutionally 
vague 7-16 
Conclusion 16-17 
Certificate of Mailing 17 
Addendum 18 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Cited 
Arrington v. United States, 
585 A.2d 1342, 1344, n. 2 (D.C. App. 1991) 9 
Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855 (1983). .11-12 
Landry v. Daley, 
280 F.Supp. 968 (D.C. 111. 1968) 14 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED PAGE 
Morisssette v. United States, 
342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952) . . . 10 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 
405 U.S. 156, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972) . . 12 
Provo City Corp. v. Willden, 
768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989) 2, 16 
Smith v. Goquen, 
415 U.S. 566, 39 L.Wd.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974) . .12 
State v. Azar, 
539 So.2d 1222 (1988) 14 
State v. Blue, 
17 Utah 175, 53 P. 978 (1898) 10 
State v. Beddo, 
22 Utah 432, 63 P.96 (1900) 9 
State v. Elton, 
680 P.2d 727 (Utah 1984) 10 
State v. James, 
819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991) 2 
State v. Featherson, 
781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) 16 
State v. Morrey, 
23 Utah 273, 64 P. 765 (1901) 9 
State v. Pettit, 
445 N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989) 14 
State v. Sulliavan, 
6 Utah2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 (1957) 15 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 
310 U.S. 88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940) . . . 12 
United States v. Harriss, 
347 U.S. 612, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 S.Ct. 808 12 
-ii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
United States v. National Dairy Products, 
372 U.S. 29, 9 L.Ed.2d 83, 83 S.Ct 
RESOLUTION CITED 
594 (196 3) 
Logan City Resolution No. »I-JD 
RULES CITED 
r * 
Rul<> 
Rule 
.... 
STATUTES 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Utah 
Cc 
Cc 
Code 
Code 
; 
Ann 
Ann 
Procedure 
'rimina_ _ rocedur^ 
'riminal Procedure . 
R
 ''6-2-101, (1.953 as amended* 
6-2-102, (.1953 as amended 
§ 76-2-103, (1953 as amended 
§ 76-10-104, (1953 as amende* 
Utah Code Ann. § 76- .10-103, (1953 as amendec 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203, (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18a-I , (1953 as amended 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3, (1953 as amended) 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-11, (1953 as amended) 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
pp^th Amendment 
-iii-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Case No. 930501-CA 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : 
Case Type: APPEAL 
-vs- : 
Priority No. 2 
TERRY B. CARLSEN, : 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a criminal judgment in the 
First Circuit Court, County of Cache, State of Utah, Logan 
City Department pursuant to the provisions of Rule 26 of 
the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and U.C.A. § 77-18a-l, 
(1953 as amended). The jurisdiction is invoked upon this 
Court under the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-2a-3(d), and 
§ 78-4-11, (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether or not the statute under which the Defendant 
was convicted, U.C.A. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is 
unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The standard of review to review this issue is that 
Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's decision on the 
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the Defendant at trial moved for dismissal of the In-
formation on grounds that the statute under which he 
was charged was unconstitutionally vague both on its face 
and as applied to Defendant at the trial. The Justice 
Court Judge denied the Defendant's motion and the jury 
returned a verdict of guilty. The Defendant was there-
after sentenced and filed a written Notice of Appeal to 
appeal his conviction-to the First Circuit Court of the 
State of Utah, County of Cache, Logan City Department. 
The Defendant filed a written Motion to Dismiss in 
the Circuit Court on grounds that the statute under which 
he was charged was unconstitutionally vague. A hearing 
was held in the Circuit Court on Defendant's motion on 
the 23rd day of April, 1993. The Circuit Court denied 
the Defendant's motion and a trial was held on the 26th 
day of April, 1993. The jury at said trial returned a 
verdict of guilty. The Defendant was sentenced on the 
1st day of June, 1993. He thereafter filed a Motion for 
a New Trial in the Circuit Court on June 8, 1993 which 
was denied by the Court on the 13th day of July, 1993. 
A Notice of Appeal was filed by the Defendant in the Circuit 
Court on the 29th day of July, 1993, appealing his conviction 
to this Court. 
C. Statement of Facts: 
On October 8, 1992, Logan City Police Officer Brad 
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Franke, Craig Andrews, along with former Logan City Police 
Officer, Tim Gil Duron, [Tim Gil Duron's employment with 
the Logan City Police Department was terminated on May 12, 
1993] together with Bear River Health Department Officer, 
Todd Barson were at Carlsen's Gas for Less for the purpose 
of having an underage police operative buy cigarettes at 
said place of business. The underage police operative 
attempted to buy cigarettes from the Defendant who was work-
ing there as a cashier, but the Defendant refused to sell 
him cigarettes because of his age. 
At the same time, two people were at Carlsen's Gas for 
Less attempting to put air in their tires. The police officers 
approached their vehicle and confiscated two packs of cigarettes. 
The two underaged youths alleged that the Defendant sold them 
the cigarettes at the same time in which the Defendant refused 
to sell cigarettes to the underage police operative. A 
citation was issued to the Defendant and he was later charged 
by Information for Selling Tobacco to a person under the age 
of Nineteen in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, (1953 
as amended) a class B misdemeanor. 
The Defendant prior to trial in the Circuit Court, filed 
a written request to Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt to 
disclose the names and addresses of all persons that he pro-
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posed or intended to call upon to testify as witnesses at 
trial pursuant to Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. The witness list furnished to the Defendant 
included the names of B. Franke; T.G. Duron; K. Kramer; 
Mike Johnson; and Thomas Morland. A subpoena was issued 
on April 20/ 1993 for a Kirk Jones and a subpoena was 
issued on April 23, 1993 for a Rob Willis to testify for 
the prosecution at the April 26, 1993 trial. The Logan 
City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt did not disclose to the 
Defendant, the names of these two witnesses. 
The Defendant prior to trial in the Circuit Court, 
filed a written Motion to Dismiss the Information on the 
grounds that the statute under which he was charged, Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) was unconstitution-
ally vague both on its face and as applied. A hearing was 
held in the Circuit Court on Defendants motion on the 
23rd day of April, 1993. [It should be noted that Scott 
L. Wyatt who represented the Plaintiff at this hearing did 
not at any time disclose to the Defendant that he did in 
fact have Kirk Jones and Rob Willis subpoenaed to testify 
at trial]. (Hearing Tr. 1-39). 
The Defendant prior to this hearing on April 23, 1993, 
attempted to have the notes of Municipal Justice Court Judge, 
Cheryl Russell and the notes of Sylvia Tibbitts of the trial 
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held in the Logan City Municipal Justice Court to establish 
that he had raised the issue of the constitutionality of 
the statute and other matters in the Justice Court. The 
trial court quashed the subpoenas. (Hearing Tr. 10). The 
trial court expressing some concern on the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, denied Defendant's motion to 
dismiss the Information on grounds of vagueness of the 
statute at the same hearing. (Hearing Tr. 31-34). 
Logan City Prosecutor, Scott L. Wyatt at the trial held 
in the Circuit Court on April 26, 1993, elicted testimony from 
Kirk Jones and Rob Willis that the Defendant had sold them 
cigarettes without asking for Identification approximately one 
year prior to the October 8, 1992 incident in which he was 
charged. [The Defendant was never cited, arrested, prosecuted, 
or convicted for selling tobacco to these two underage youths]. 
The Defendant objected to both witnesses testimony on grounds 
that Mr. Wyatt had failed to disclose their names on the 
witness list or endorse their names on the Information and 
because their testimony relating to prior bad acts was in-
admissible. The trial court overruled the objections and 
allowed their testimony. 
The trial court did not give the jury any instructions 
that there was a culpable mental state required on the part 
of the Defendant to commit the offense as defined under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-104, such as intent, knowledge or reckless-
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ness as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103/ (1953 
as amended). 
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. Judgment and 
sentence was imposed and entered by the Court on June 1/ 
1993. The Defendant filed a written Motion for a New Trial 
on July 8, 1993, on grounds of the prosecutor's misconduct 
in failing to disclose the names of Kirk Jones and Rob 
Willis on his witness list and having their testimony 
allude to matters which were not admissible as evidence. 
The trial court denied the motion for a new trial by a 
Order filed on the 13th day of July, 1993. A Notice of 
Appeal was filed by the Defendant in the trial court on 
the 29th day of July, 1993 appealing his conviction to this 
Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The statute under which the Defendant was charged and 
convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) is 
not a strict liability statute and is unconstitutionally vague 
both on its face and as applied in this case in violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and the Defendant's conviction 
should therefore be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
The statute under which the Defendant was convicted. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104 is unconstitutionally vague. 
The Defendant was initially charged in the Logan City 
Municipal Justice Court by Information for violating the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, (1953 as amended) 
which provides as follows: 
Any person who sells, gives or furnishes any cigar, 
cigarette, or tobacco in any form, to any person 
under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C mis-
demeanor on the first offense, a class B misdemeanor 
on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on 
subsequent offenses. 
Logan City Resolution No. 91-36 adopted by the Logan City 
Council and approved by the Logan City Mayor creating the 
Municipal Justice Courts appears to restrict that Court's 
jurisdiction to all offenses of the Utah Traffic Code, Class 
C Misdemeanors under Utah law, infractions under Utah Law and 
all equivalent ordinances enacted by the Logan Municipal Council 
that have alleged to have occurred within the Logan Municipal 
boundaries. The Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with 
the Utah Circuit Court over driving under the influence of 
alcohol and reckless driving charges under State law which are 
classified as Class B misdemeanors under State law and equivalent 
ordinances enacted by the Logan Municipal Council. The Resolution 
which is included in the Addendum does not include jurisdiction 
of the Court over other offenses classified as class B misde-
meanors under State law. The Defendant therefore contends that 
the Logan City Municipal Justice Court did not have subject 
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matter jurisdiction over the offense in which the Defendant 
was charged for violating under a State statute, Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-104 as a class B misdemeanor. Subject matter 
jurisdiction cannot be waived. State v. Beddo, 22 Utah 
432/ 63 P. 96 (1900); State v. Morrey, 23 Utah 273, 64 
P. 765 (1901). This Court in reviewing the constitutionality 
of the statute is requested to take judicial notice of the 
jurisdictional deficiency. 
The Defendant's challenge to the constitutionality 
and validity of the statute under which he was convicted 
constitutes a challenge to the court's subject matter 
jurisdiction which cannot be waived. Arrinqton v. United 
States, 585 A.2d 1342, 1344, n. 2, (D.C. App. 1991). See 
also, Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
Apparently, the trial court considered the statute 
under which the Defendant was charged and convicted was or 
is a strict liability statute because the Court did not 
give the jury any instructions that a culpable mental state 
required on the part of the Defendant to commit the offense 
as defined under Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, such as intent, 
knowledge or recklessness as defined under the provisions 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-101, § 76-2-102, and § 76-2-103, 
(1953 as amended). 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104 should 
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not be construed to be a strict liability statute because 
it does not clearly indicate a legislative purpose to im-
pose criminal responsibility for commission of the conduct 
prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any 
culpable mental state. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727 (Utah 
1984); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 96 L.Ed. 
288, 72 S.Ct. 240 (1952). 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175, 
53 P. 978 (1898) held that a public officer was not punish-
able for an act committed innocently without criminal intent, 
where statute, with no reference to mental state, made private 
appropriation of public money a felony. 
Mr. Wyatt at the hearing held on April 23, 1993, objected 
to any instruction as to a culpable mental state on the part 
of the Defendant. The proceedings at page 32 went as follows: 
MR. WYATT: He's entitled to an instruction on — that 
he voluntarily sold, but I don't think that hefs en-
titled to an instruction that says that he had to know 
that this person was under age. 
The Defendant contends that the provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-104 are unconstitutionally vague both on its face 
and as applied in this case in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Consti-
tution. United States v. National Dairy Products, 372 U.S. 29, 
9 L.Ed.2d 83, 83 S.Ct. 594 (1963). 
The United States Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, 
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461 U.S. 352 at 359 n. 8., 75 L.Ed.2d 903 at 910 n. 8., 
103 S.Ct. 1855 observed: 
In his dissent. Justice White claims that "[t]he 
upshot of our cases . . . is that whether or not a 
statute purports to regulate constitutionally pro-
tected conduct, it should not be held unconstitution-
ally vague on its face unless it is vague in all of 
its possible applications." Post, at 370, 75 L.Ed. 
2d at 917-918. The description of our holdings is 
inaccurate in several respects. First, it neglects 
the fact that we permit a facial challenge if a law 
reaches "a substantial amount of constitutionally 
protected conduct." Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 
Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494, 71 L.Ed. 
2d 362, 102 S.Ct. 1186 (1982). Second, where a 
statute imposes criminal penalties, the standard of 
certainty is higher. See Winters v. New York, 333 
U.S. 507, 92 L.Ed. 840, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948). This 
concern has, at times, led us to invalidate a criminal 
statute on its face even when it could conceivably 
have had some valid application. See, e.g. Colautti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 394-401, 58 L.Ed.2d 596, 
99 S.Ct. 675 (1979); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 
451, 85 L.Ed. 888, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939). The dissent 
concedes that the "overbreadth doctrine permits facial 
challenge of a law that reaches a substantial amount 
of conduct protected by the First Amendment. . ." 
Post, at 371, 75 L.Ed.2d at 918. However, in the 
dissent's view, one may not "confuse vagueness and 
overbreadth by attacking the enactment as being vague 
as applied to conduct other than his own." Post, at 
370, 75 L.Ed.2d, at 917. But we have traditionally 
viewed vagueness and overbreadth as logically related 
and similar doctrines. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board 
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609, 17 L.Ed.2d 629, 87 
S.Ct. 675 (1967); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433, 
9 L.Ed.2d 405, 83 S.Ct. 328 (1963). See also Note, 
The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67, 110-113 (1960). 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104 are un-
constitutionally vague not only in the sense that it "fails 
to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that 
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his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," 
United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 98 L.Ed. 989, 74 
S.Ct. 808; but lacks any ascertainable standards of guilt, 
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 165-
166, 31 L.Ed.2d 110, 117-118, 92 S.Ct. 839 (1972). The 
statute also fails to establish minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement, Smith v. Goquen, 415 U.S. 566, 39 L.Ed.2d 
605, 94 S.Ct. 1242 (1974); but its vagueness encourages 
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions. Thornhill 
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 84 L.Ed. 1093, 60 S.Ct. 736. 
The Supreme Court in Kolender v. Lawson, supra, 461 
U.S. at 357-58, 75 L.Ed.2d at 909 observed: 
As generally stated, the void-for-vagueness doctrine 
requires that a penal statute define the criminal 
offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary 
people can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. - -[Citations omitted] 
Although the doctrine focuses both on actual notice 
to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have re-
cognized recently that the more important aspect of 
the vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but 
the other principal element of the doctrine—the 
requirement that a legislature establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement." Smith, 415 
U.S. at 574, 39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. Where 
the legislature fails to provide such minimal guide-
lines, a criminal statute may permit "a standardless 
sweep [that] allows policeman, prosecutors, and juries 
to pursue their personal predilections." Id., at 575, 
39 L.Ed.2d 605, 94 S.Ct. 1242. 
The Utah Legislature in enacting the provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-104, failed to established such minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement as required under Smith 
and Kolender, thereby allowing the police, prosecutors and 
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juries to pursue their own personal predilections. 
This can best be demonstrated by comparing Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-104 with other statutes involving adults and 
minors. For example, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-103/ (1953 
as amended) provides as follows: 
It is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of 
any place of business to knowingly permit persons 
under age nineteen to frequent a place of business 
while they are using tobacco. 
The prosecution under the provisions of § 76-10-103 
has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the proprietor of a business knowingly permitted persons 
under age nineteen to frequent the business while they are 
using tobacco. 
An identical situation exists involving sales of 
alcoholic beverages to minors as provided under Utah Code 
Ann. § 32A-12-203(b), (1953 as amended). The prosecution 
under said statute has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a person knowingly sold or furnished 
alcoholic beverages to a person under the age of 21. 
What is lacking in the statute challenged in this case, 
is the requirement for the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that a person knowingly sold or furnished 
tobacco to a person under the age of nineteen. The pro-
section need only to prove that a person sold or furnished 
cigarettes to a person who happens or turns out to be under 
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the age of nineteen. The prosecution has no burden to 
prove any mens rea as to knowledge, intent or reckless-
ness. The prosecutor in the instant case did not have 
such burden of proof to prove any mens rea because the 
trial court did not instruct the jury as to knowledge, 
intent or recklessness. A merchant or cashier who sells 
cigarettes to a person who appears to be over nineteen and 
who furnishes the merchant or cashier with false Identifi-
cation which shows them to be over nineteen could be arrested, 
prosecuted and convicted under the provisions of § 76-10-104. 
The statute because of the lack of any mens rea requirements 
reaches a substantial amount of innocent conduct and should 
therefore be declared unconstitutionally vague. State v. 
Azar, 539 So.2d 1222 (1988). 
The Federal Courts have held that Due Process requires 
that knowledge and intent be essential elements of a crime. 
Landry v. Daley, 280 F.Supp. 968 (D.C. 111. 1968). 
The Nebraska Court has held that elimination of criminal 
intent as element necessary for violation of a statute may 
violate due process when the penalty for violation of statute 
is severe or conviction for violation of statute may irrepar-
ably damage the defendant's reputation. State v. Pettit, 445 
N.W.2d 890 (Neb. 1989). 
A conviction for violating Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, 
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which can ultimately result in a class A misdemeanor 
conviction, punishable by a year imprisonment and a 
fine of $ 2,500.00 plus a surcharge is a severe penalty 
requiring that knowledge or criminal intent be included 
as a necessary element of the offense. A person found 
guilty of selling alcoholic beverages to a person under 
the age of 21 is guilty of a class B misdemeanor offense, 
but the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203(b) 
requires that the person knowingly sold such beverages 
to a person under the age of 21. 
When applying Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104 to the facts 
of this case would require a review of the prosecutor's 
conduct. Mr. Wyatt failed to disclose to the Defendant 
on his witness list the names of Kirk Jones and Rob Willis 
dispite the fact that he had these witnesses subpoenaed 
several days before trial. See, Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Mr. Wyatt over the Defendant's object-
ions elicited testimony from these two witnesses which 
he knew was inadmissible. State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah 2d 
110, 307 P.2d 212 at 216 (1957). Kirk Jones' and Rob 
Willis' testimony that the Defendant sold them cigarettes 
without asking for Identification approximately one year 
prior to the October 8, 1992 incident in which the Defendant 
was charged was inadmissible as evidence. The evidence 
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and testimony relating to uncharged criminal offenses was 
inadmissible under Rule 403 and Rule 404 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989). 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, lacks 
minimal guidelines to govern law enforcement because of 
the lack of any standards relating to Identification re-
quirements for merchants or cashier's in the business of 
selling tobacco products. The lack of such standards allows 
the police, prosecutors and juries to pursue their own 
personal predilections as to such Identification requirements. 
The Utah Supreme Court held that the Courts will not 
rewrite a statute or ignore its plain language in order to 
reach a constitutional construction. Provo City Corp. v. 
Willden, 768 P.2d 455, 458 (Utah 1989). 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104 are un-
constitutionally vague both in its application in the instant 
case and on its face. The statute should be declared by 
this Court not to be a strict liability statute and be 
declared unconstitutionally vague because of the lack of 
any requirement on the part of the prosecution to prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the mens rea of knowledge or criminal 
intent. 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant respectfully submits that the statute 
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under which he was convicted, Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-104, 
should be declared unconstitutionally vague and his 
conviction should therefore be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this £#^day of February, 1994. 
v
 fc TERRY JS. CARLSEN 
Appellant in Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed two copies of the Brief of 
Appellant on this Q^ day of February, 1994 to the 
following listed persons: 
Scott L. Wyatt 
Logan City Prosecutor 
255 North Main 
Logan, Utah 84321 
TERRY/fe. CARLSEN 
- 1 7 -
A D D E N D U M 
CITY OF LOGAN 
RESOLUTION NO. 91-36 
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL OXJNCIL, STATE OF UTAH AS 
FOLDCWS: 
WHEREAS, the 1990-91 Utah legislature through House Bill 436, 
granted authority to municipalities, including the City of Logan, to 
create a Municipal Court, and 
WHEREAS, previous to the passage of this legislation, Logan City did 
not have authority to establish such a Municipal Court, and 
WHEREAS, the jurisdiction of such a Municipal Court would be to have 
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses of the Utah Traffic Code, Class 
C Misdemeanors under Utah law, infractions under Utah Law and all 
equivalent ordinances enacted by the Logan Municipal Council that have 
alleged to have occurred within the Logan Municipal boundaries. The 
Court would also have concurrent jurisdiction with the Utah Circuit Court 
over driving under the influence of alcohol and reckless driving charges 
under State law, Class B Misdemeanors under State law and equivalent 
ordinances enacted by the Logan Municipal Council. The court would 
further have jurisdiction over small claims matters where the amount in 
dispute is less than or equal to $1,000 so long as the Municipal Court is 
certified by the State Judicial Council, and 
WHEREAS, to establish such a Municipal Court that shall be made 
effective on the 1st day of January, 1991, the City of Logan must deliver 
a written declaration of its intent to do the same to the State Judicial 
Council on or before the 1st day of July, 1991, and 
WHEREAS, it has been determined by the Logan Municipal Council that 
providing a fair and impartial court to hear disputes arising frem 
alleged offenses of the above-referenced laws, is a priority and of 
utmost importance, and 
WHEREAS, that to establish such a court, would service the needs of 
Logan City residents and other individuals who visit or travel through 
Logan City, in that it would help preserve the quality of life enjoyed 
within this craraminity and facilitate the peace, health and welfare for 
all %Aio live and visit here, and 
WHEREAS, it would serve other needs of Utah State government and 
Logan municipal government, and 
WHEREAS, it is believed by the Logan Municipal Council that the 
funds the City will receive throuc^ i currently established fines and fees, 
will pay the cost and expense of creating and maintaining a Municipal 
Court; 
THEREFORE, be it resolved by the Logan Municipal Council, State of 
Utah as follows: 
That the City of Logan elects to establish a Municipal Court System 
to service municipal and citizen needs within the boundaries of said 
city. 
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Logan Municipal Council, State of 
Utah, direct Mayor Russell Fjeldsted to provide notice to the State 
Judicial Council on or before the 1st day of July, 1991 of these 
intentions. 
PASSED BY THE LOGAN MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, STATE OF UTAH, THIS \Q 
DAY OF VJ3/C/<y , 1991 
*&jp&\ F. Bracken, thairman 
Lois Prire, Recorder 
PRESENTATION TO MAYOR 
JL1KZ JLV 
Qpwncil to 
The foregoing resolution was presented by the Logan Municipal 
•i the Mayor for his approval or disapproval this )^z^ day of 
"•' -
1 9 9 1
- j£~~^ „ 
LynryT- Bracken, Chairman 
MAYORS APPROVAL OR DISAPPROVAL 
day of 
taregoing resolution i s hereby 
A ^ H L ^ 1991-
76-10-103 CRIMINAL CODE 
76-10-103, Permitting minors to use tobacco in place of 
business. 
It is a class C misdemeanor for the proprietor of any place of business to 
knowingly permit persons under age nineteen to frequent a place of business 
while they are using tobacco. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, 5 76-10-103. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2<L — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 18. 
C.J.S. — 43 CJS. Infants §§ 92, 95. 
Key Numbers. — Infants *> 13. 
76-10-104. Furnishing cigars, cigarettes or tobacco to 
minors — Penalties. 
Any person who sells, gives, or furnishes any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in 
any form, to any pei n under 19 years of age, is guilty of a class C misde-
meanor on the first o^ense, a class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and 
a class A misdemeanor on subsequent offenses. 
History. C. 1953, 76-10-104, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-
1974, ch. 32, 5 39; 1989, ch. 194, 5 1. roent, effective July 1,1989, added "on the first 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974, offense, a class B misdemeanor on the second 
ch. 32, § 39 repealed former § 76-10-104, as offense, and a class A misdemeanor on subse-
enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104, relat- quent offenses" at the end of the section and 
ing to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in made a minor stylistic change, 
enclosed public place, and enacted present 
§ 76-10-104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur . 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infante § 16. AJLR. — Civil liability for tobacco sales to 
C.JJS. — 43 CJS. Infants §§ 92, 95. minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238. 
Key Numbers. — Infants *=» 13. 
76-10-105, Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or 
tobacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance offi-
cer authority —Juveni le court jurisdiction. 
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(2) A compliance cfficer appointed by a board of education under Section 
53A-3-402 may iss1 citations for violations of this section committed on 
school property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile 
court. 
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(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at 
any time before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the 
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced. After verdict, an Indict-
ment or information may be amended so as to state the offense with such 
particularity as to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the 
same set of facts. 
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are required to 
inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense charged, so as to 
enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant may file a written motion for 
a bill of particulars. The motion shall be filed at arraignment or within ten 
days thereafter, or at such later time as the court may permit. The court may, 
on its own motion, direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars 
may be amended or supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as 
justice may require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall 
be limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the essen-
tial elements of the particular offense charged. 
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because any 
name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated. 
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or proviso 
contained in the statute creating or defining the offense. 
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their usual 
meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have acquired a legal 
meaning. 
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not invalidate 
the indictment or information. 
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or information 
was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed. Failure to endorse shall 
not affect the validity but endorsement shall be ordered by the court on appli-
cation of the defendant. Upon request the prosecuting attorney shall, except 
upon a showing of good cause, furnish the names of other witnesses he pro-
poses to call whose names are not so endorsed. 
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing it to 
appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer or counsel* 
Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as against a natural 
person. 
Cross-References. — Accused entitled to "Indictment" defined, § 77-1-3. 
copy of accusation, Utah Const-, Art. I, Sec. 12. "Information" defined, § 77-1-3. 
Circuit courts, criminal jurisdiction, Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
§ 78-4-5. Justice courts, criminal jurisdiction, 
Jurisdiction of military court, § 39-6-16. § 78-5-104 et seq. 
Criminal Code definition of ^corporation," Juveniles, jurisdiction, transfer. §§ 78-3a-16 
§ 76-2-201. to 78-3a-19. 
Criminal Code not strictly construed, Nonmaterial errors and mistakes. Rule 30. 
§ 76-1-106. Preliminary examination, Rule 7. 
Criminal responsibility of corporation, Proof of corporate existence, § 77-17-5. 
§ 76-2-204. Prosecution by indictment or information af-
Criminal responsibility of person for conduct ter examination and commitment or waiver 
in name of corporation. § 76-2-205. thereof, Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 13. 
Double jeopardy, Utah Consx.., Art. I, Sec. 12; Removal of ofneers, Utah Const.. Art. VI, 
§§ 76-1-401 to 76-1-405. 77-1-6. Sec. 21; § 77-6-1 et seq. 
General definitions for Criminal Code, Statutory construction and definitions in 
§ 76-1-601. general, §§ 68-3-11, 68-3-12. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS —Failure to request. 
—Following amendment of information. 
Bills of particulars. _ N o t r e q u i r e d . 
—In general. —Purpose. 
—Contents. —Substantially provided. 
—Discretion of court. Indictments and informations. 
—Effect on evidence at trial , —Amendments. 
—Failure to provide. —Choice. 
Section 
76-2-305. 
76-2-306. 
76-2-307. 
76-2-308. 
Mental illness — Use as a defense 
r— Influence of alcohol or other 
substance voluntarily con-
sumed — Definition. 
Voluntary intoxication. 
Voluntary termination of efforts 
prior to offense. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Part 4 
Section 
76-2-402. 
76-2-403. 
76-2-404. 
76-2-405. 
76-2-406. 
Force in defense of person — Forc-
ible felony defined. 
Force in arrest. 
Peace officer's use of deadly force. 
Force in defense of habitation. 
Force in defense of property. 
Justification Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility 
76-2-401. Justification as defense 
allowed. 
When 
PART 1 
CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal 
responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negli-
gence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining 
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations 
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, ch. 90, § 1; 
1983, ch. 98, § 1. 
NOTES TO DEr.TSTONS 
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
dangerous drugs as contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor, 36 A.L.R.3d 1292. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=> 23. 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Depraved indifference. 
Cited. 
Depraved indifference. 
In a prosecution for second degree murder, 
although the court's jury instruction did not 
expressly treat the element of knowledge, 
there was no error since the other jury instruc-
tions and the evidence of the defendant's ac-
tions left little room for the jury to misunder-
stand that the defendant must have been 
aware that his conduct created a grave risk of 
death to another, within the definitions con-
tained in the instructions. State v. Fontana, 
680 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1984). 
Cited in State v. Whitehair, 735 P.2d 39 
(Utah 1987); In re Estate of Wagley, 760 P.2d 
316 (Utah 1988); State v. Padilla, 776 P.2d 
1329 (Utah 1989). 
CRIMINAL OFFENSES 32A-12-203 
Section Part 4 
32A-12-308. Offering or soliciting bribes or Advertising and Soliciting 
gifts. 
32A-12-309. Organizine for pecuniary profit. Section 
32A-12-310. Forgerv. 32A-12-401. Advertising prohibited — Ex-
ceptions. 
PART 2 
SALE, PURCHASE, POSSESSION, AND 
CONSUMPTION 
32A-12-201. Unlawful sale or supply, 
(1) It is unlawful for any person, licensee, permittee, or their officers, man-
agers, employees, or agents to keep for sale, or to directly or indirectly or upon 
any pretense or device, sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply to 
another, any alcoholic beverage or product, except as provided by this title or 
the rules of the commission adopted under this title. 
(2) A violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-12-6, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
1985, ch.~175, § 1; 1989. ch. 262, § 1; renum- ment, effective April 29. 1991, substituted 
bered by L. 1990, ch. 23, § 130; 1991, ch. 241. "class B" for "class A" in Subsection (2). 
§ 29. 
32A-12-203. Unlawful sale or supply to minors, 
( D A person may not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any 
alcoholic beverage or product to any person under the age of 21 years. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (1), a person who knowingh' 
sells, offers to sell, or otherwise furnishes or supplies any alcoholic beverage 
or product to any person under the age of 21 years is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) This section does not apply to the furnishing or supplying of an alcoholic 
beverage or product to a minor for medicinal purposes by the parent or guard-
ian of the minor or by the minor's physician or dentist, in accordance with this 
title. 
History: C. 1953, 32A-12-8, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 175, § 1; renumbered by L. 1990, 
ch. 23, § 132; 1991, ch. 49, § 1; 1991, ch. 241, 
§ 30. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment by ch. 49, effective March 13,1991, added 
present Subsection (2); designated former Sub-
section (2) as present Subsection (3); and de-
leted former Subsection <3* which made viola-
tion of the section a class A misdemeanor and 
provided a minimum mandatory fine of $500. 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 241, effective 
April 29. 1991, substituted "class B" for "class 
A" in the first sentence in former Subsection 
(3). 
This section is set out as reconciled by the 
Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
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AMENDMENT III [1791] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of 
tne Owner, nor in time of war. but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV [1791] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
acainst unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly descr.b.ng 
me place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V [1791] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime unless 
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising «n the land or 
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived 
of lifer liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken 
for public use. without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT XIV [1868] 
Section 1. All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives she* be apportioned among the several. States according 
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State excluding 
Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for 
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Execu-
tive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, 
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age 
in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, 
or under any State, who having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as 
an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive 
or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have 
engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the ene-
mies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disa-
bility. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, in-
cluding debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing in-
surrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any 
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion 
against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave: but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
AMENDMENT XV [1870] 
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude. 
TERRY B- CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 8432] 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH,
 : 
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
 : 
TERRY B. CARLSEN,
 : 
Case No- 923 000750 
Defendant. • 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, Terry B. Carlsen, 
and pursuant to the provisions of Rule ] 6 of the Utah Sules of 
Criminal Procedure, and hereby requests the prosecutor in the 
above-entitled matter to disclose to the defense the following 
material and information: 
1. All relevant written or recorded statements of the 
defendant-
2. The criminal record of the defendant-
3. All physical evidence seized from the defendant. 
4- All evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to 
negate the guilt of the defendant, mitigate the guilt of the 
defendant, or mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced 
punishment. 
5. The names and addresses of each and every person in 
which the prosecutor intends or will call upon to testify on 
behalf of the plaintiff either during their case in chief or 
during rebuttal to any defense presented by the defendant 
during the trial in the above-entitled matter. 
6. All evidence in which the prosecutor intends or will 
introduce during rebuttal to any defense presented during the 
course of the trial in the above-entitled matter. 
7. All photographic evidence in which the prosecutor 
intends or will introduce at the trial in the above-entitled 
matter. 
8. All inculpatory and exculpatory evidence, material, 
and information known to the prosecution or to be used at trial 
by the prosecution, 
9- Copies of all complaints filed by citizens with the 
Logan City Police Department and the Logan City Mayorfs Office 
against Logan City Police Officer, Tim Gil Duron, and Logan City 
Police Of f icer O ^ ^ / Z^^ ^ /4^^> , during the course 
of their employment with the Logan City Police Departmenc and 
any and all documents showing any disciplinary action being 
taken against either or both officers for misconduct. 
10. All documents of any investigation of Tim Gil Duron, 
and /i/?es'/ r^aAr/^Zfi for misconduct by the Logan 
City Police Department; Cache County Sheriff's Office; Logan 
City Attorney's Office; Cache County Attorney's Office; Federal 
Bureau of Investigation; and the Utah Attorney General's Office. 
DATED this /) C/ day of January, Z993-
^ ^ TSRRY B< CARLSEN 
y 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I hand delivered a true and exact copy of 
the foregoing Request for Discovery to Scott L. Wyatt, Attorney 
for Plaintiff by leaving a copy thereof at the Logan City Prosecutor 
Office located at 255 North Main, Logan, Dtah on this ft (/ day 
of January, 3 993. 
W. SCOTT BARRETT 
CITY ATTORNEY 
CITY OF LOGAN 
255 NORTH MAIN 
LOGAN, UTAH 84321 
(801) 750-9800 JEFFREY "R" BURBANK 
PROSECUTOR 
SCOTT L WYATT 
PROSECUTOR 
April 16, 1993 
Terry B. Carlsen 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
RE: State of Utah vs. Terry Carlsen 
Dear Terry: 
Enclosed please find a copy of the subpoena which we are 
i s s u i n g for the t r i a l of State of Utah vs . Terry Carlsen scheduled 
for Apri l 26, 1993 a t 9:00 am at F i r s t Ci rcu i t Court. On tha t 
subpoena you w i l l find a l i s t of witnesses we plan t o c a l l to 
t e s t i f y . 
Should you have any questions, p lease fee l free to con tac t our 
o f f i c e s . 
Sincerely, 
7UX> 
S^y ia T i b b i t t s 
Assis tant to City Prosecutor 
Enclosure 
CUUM l Y Uh CACHE — LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH,
 p i a m i f f 
vs 
TERRY B. CSRLSEN, 
Defendant(s) 
(Address and DOB) 
S U B P O E N A 
No. 92100075Q 
THE STATE OF UTAH OF: 
(Name) (Address) (Date Served) 
B. FRANKE, LCPD 
T. G. DURON, LCPD 
K. KRAMER, LCPD 
Mike Johnson , 744 Northl-.200l.West, Logan, Utah 
Thomas Morland, 138 North 500 West, Logan, Utah 
Todd Barson , 655 Eas t 1300 Nor th , Logan, Utah 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled action before the 
above court at the following time and place: 
Date: A p r i l 26, 1993 Time: 9:00 am 
Place: FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 140 NORTH 100 WEST LOGAN, UTAH 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, documents, 
or other items: 
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a warrant for your arrest, 
^\S £ OF 7^
 v 
Dated: 4 /16 /93 / ^ - " " ^ ^ V 
/-/ 
"PLEASE CALL THE COURT (752-6893) THE MORNING OF THE TRIAL TO:^20NFIRM.XHE J 
PROCEEDINGS. THIS WILL ELIMINATE ANY UNNECESSARY INCONVENIE$£ES*^bR . / 
YOU..THANK YOU! %-f-Oo^ -•*' 
Circuit Judge/Clerk/County Attorney--"--"'-' 
* " B E AT THE CIRCUIT COURT (140 North 100 West) 15 MINUTES BEFORE THE TRIAL 
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED! 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE — LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
/7J, ecu 
STATE OF "JTAH, Plantiff 
vs 
TERRY B. CARLSEN, Defendant(s) 
(Address and DOB) 
S U B P O E N A 
No. 921000750 
THE STATE OF UTAH OF: 
(Name) (Address) (Date Served) 
Kirk J o n e s , 528 West 200 Nor th , Logan, Utah 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled action before the 
above court at the following time and place: 
Date: Apr i l 26, 1993 Time: 9:00 am 
Place: FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 140 NORTH 100 WEST LOGAN, UTAH 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, documents, 
or other items: 
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a warrant for your 
D a t e d :
 4 /20/93 
•PLEASE CALL THE COURT (752-6893) THE MORNING OF THE T R I A ^ T V ^ ^ F I J g X ^ I 
PROCEEDINGS. THIS WILL ELIMINATE ANY UNNECESSARY INCOr -«-*--<="-- > 
YOU. THANK YOU! " * ^ g ^ w -
Circuit Judge/Clerk/County Attorney 
***BE AT THE CIRCUIT COURT (140 North 100 West) 15 MINUTES BEFORE THE TRIAL 
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED! 
JIN i n c v-iivvui i ^\_n_/i\.i, o m i c u r u i / \ n 
COUNTY OF CACHE — LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
Plantiff 
TERRY B. CARLSEN, Defendant(s) 
(Address and DOB) 
S U B P O E N A 
No. 
THE STATE OF UTAH OF: 
(Name) (Address) (Date Served) 
ROE WILLIS 
YOU ARE COMMANDED to appear and give testimony in the above-entitled action before the 
above court at the following time and place: 
Date: A p r i l I 2 6 , 1993 Time: 9:00 am 
Place: FIRST CIRCUIT COURT 140 NORTH 100 WEST LOGAN, UTAH 
YOU ARE FURTHER COMMANDED to bring with you the following papers, documents, 
or other items: 
If you fail to obey this subpoena, the court may issue a warrant for your 
Dated: 4 /23/93 
tT^tw 
*PLEASE CALL THE COURT (752-6893) THE MORNING OF THE TRI 
PROCEEDINGS. THIS WILL ELIMINATE ANY UNNECESSARY INCO 
YOU. THANK YOU! 
Circuit Jucge/Clerk/County Anorney 
***BE AT THE CIRCUIT COURT (140 Nonh 100 West) 15 MINUTES BEFORE THE TRIAL 
UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTIFIED! 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
* * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH * 
(City), 
Plaintiff, * HEARING 
VS. * Case No. 921000750 
TERRY B. CARLSEN, * 
Defendant. * 
* * * * * ORIGINAL 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 23rd day of 
April, 1993, the Hearing in the above-entitled matter 
was held at the above-entitled Court, Logan, Utah. 
This Hearing was electronically recorded. 
STACY & ASSOCIATES 
717 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1188 
1 MR. CARLSEN: But do they — are they — we 
2 don't know what the policies are. I've been trying to 
3 get a copy for the last two weeks and the Police Chief 
4 or Craig Andrews won't give me a policy. 
5 THE COURT: Well, maybe they don't have a 
6 policy. I don't know whether they have a policy or 
7 not. 
8 MR. CARLSEN: Well, that's what we should find 
9 out in Court. 
10 THE COURT: Well, I think that's what you can 
11 find out in your cross examination of the officers 
12 involved. 
13 MR. CARLSEN: Yeah. So I don't see any harm 
14 if — 
15 THE COURT: So I think that you are certainly 
16 at liberty to cross examine and do that, but as far as 
17 the Motion to Quash the Subpoena on Cheryl Russell and 
18 Sylvia Tibbitts and who else, gentlemen? 
19 MR. BARRETT: Mayor Feljstead. 
20 THE COURT: The three of them? 
21 MR. BARRETT: Yes. That's all it addresses, 
22 although the Chief of Police has also been served with 
23 a subpoena, but I am informed that he doesn't intend to 
24 come because he wasn't tendered any witness fees. 
25 THE COURT: Well, none of them have to come 
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1 unless they've got witness fees, that's the law. 
2 MR. BARRETT: That's right. The rule requires 
3 that and none of them have been tendered a witness fee. 
4 THE COURT: That's right. None of them have 
5 to come if they're not paid the witness fees. That's 
6 the law. Well, in view of what I've said, the Court is 
7 going to quash the subpoenas. Now, if you want to — 
8 feel strongly enough to reserve Mayor Feljstead because 
9 you want to call him as a defense witness and pay him 
10 his witness fee, I guess that's up to you, Mr. Carlsen. 
11 MR. CARLSEN: Thank you. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: But the others, no. 
13 MR. BARRETT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Now, that brings us up to 
15 the next Motion, which is the Defendant's Motion to 
16 Dismiss — Let me find it here — alleging 
17 constitutional questions it appears. The Defendant has 
18 alleged that the section that you're proceeding under, 
19 Mr. Wyatt, is unconstitutionally vague, violates the 
20 due process clause of the State and Federal 
21 Constitution, and that Section 76-10-104 is 
22 unconstitutionally vague. As I read your Memorandum, 
23 Mr. Carlsen, you're basically arguing that -- if I 
24 understand what you're saying correctly, that because 
25 the Statute does not require scienter or knowledge that 
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1 basic — the reason why I was even charged. 
2 MR. WYATT: But then that becomes a jury issue 
3 whether you knew rather than a vagueness. 
4 THE COURT: Do you want to prepare a jury 
5 instruction on that and submit it to the Court for 
6 consideration? 
7 MR. CARLSEN: You mean about the law? 
8 THE COURT: About knowing — you knew or 
9 should have known or whatever you want to do. 
10 MR. WYATT: Yeah. We'd like to just take it 
11 out of the statute that knowing. 
12 THE COURT: The jury instruction that I 
13 propose to give is right here, and that's the thing 
14 that kind of bothered the Court this morning. It says 
15 that before you can find the Defendant guilty of 
16 selling tobacco to a minor you must find beyond a 
17 reasonable doubt the following elements. One, the 
18 Defendant did sell the tobacco to another person, two, 
19 that the other person was under the age of nineteen 
20 years, three, that the act took place on October 8th, 
21 four, that the place is Logan City. It just seems to 
22 me that we could put in another element that he knew or 
23 should have known that the person was under the age of 
24 nineteen years or something like that. 
25 MR. WYATT: Well, I don't think that that's 
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1 the burden. I think that the knowing or with 
2 negligence relates to the conduct that the Defendant 
3 engaged in rather than necessarily the result of the 
4 conduct. If I fire a trigger, I knowingly pulled the 
5 trigger. That's different than I knowingly intended to 
6 kill a person, and so --
7 THE COURT: Yeah. 
8 MR. WYATT: He's entitled to an instruction 
9 on — that he voluntarily sold, but I don't think that 
10 he's entitled to an instruction that says that he had 
11 to know that this person was under the age. 
12 THE COURT: Well, that — 
13 MR. WYATT: That's my issue on that. 
14 THE COURT: This is covered here that the 
15 Defendant did sell the tobacco to another person, and 
16 his defense is he didn't sell it as I understand it. 
17 MR. WYATT: Right. And so it has nothing to 
18 do with what we're talking about. 
19 THE COURT: That's — As I understand his 
20 defense, he claims he never sold it to this gentleman. 
21 MR. CARLSEN: Yes. 
22 MR. WYATT: Yeah. So the issue is whether he 
23 sold it or not and has nothing to do with whether he 
24 knew he was old enough. 
25 MR. CARLSEN: Well, we go back to what the 
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1 statute is in the first place or what the code, what 
2 I'm charged with, if it is a legit code, if it is a — 
3 THE COURT: Well, that's something that I 
4 guess the Appellate Court can resolve if you appeal it 
5 and take it down there to them, and — but at this 
6 point in time the Court from the fact situation that 
7 apparently exists in the case, I don't think that's 
8 going to — it's not a — it's not an issue that can 
9 be — the Court feels is prima facia, at least to rule 
10 in your favor on the basis of your motion. You're 
11 attacking this on the general statute itself alleging 
12 because it doesn't use the term knowing as it did in 
13 the previous statute that therefore it's vague — it's 
14 void for vagueness. 
15 MR. CARLSEN: Uh huh. 
16 THE COURT: And therefore unconstitutional. 
17 And as Mr. Wyatt points out in these other — in the 
18 Greenwood case, the North Salt Lake case and the other 
19 case --
2 0 MR. WYATT: Faris. 
21 THE COURT: The Faris case, the Court seems to 
22 indicate that you carry the burden, as the challenger 
23 has the burden to demonstrate unconstitutionality and 
24 then it says before we can get to that it says here 
25 that the Defendant relies upon the due process 
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1 (inaudible) the statute is invalid on its face. 
2 However, because we find the statute is valid as 
3 applied to the facts of the case, we do not address the 
4 Defendants alleged facial validity of the statute. 
5 Facial validity can only be found if the statute is 
6 incapable of any valid application. Well, the Court — 
7 It seems that with the proffered facts that 
8 are before the Court that we're not meeting that issue 
9 head on, and so the jury is going to have to decide the 
10 question, and it looks to me like it will boil down to 
11 whether you sold or whether you didn't sell, so the 
12 Court is going to deny the motion and, of course, 
13 depending on what happens with the jury, if you're 
14 found guilty then you may elect to decide to take it 
15 down to the Appellate Court and get a decision on this, 
16 because the fact that I'm denying your motion at this 
17 time and holding as I am because of the uniqueness of 
18 the facts doesn't mean that your general argument as to 
19 the overall invalidity might not be well taken. 
20 MR. CARLSEN: Going back to those jury 
21 instructions, I have a request for those if I — 
22 THE COURT: Well, now is the time to present 
23 it. 
24 MR. CARLSEN: I don't know if Mr. Wyatt is 
25 opposed. We can hear from him now while we're all 
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First Circuit Court, State of Utah, County of Cache, 
Logan Department 
STATE OF UTAH LOGAN CITY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff ) 
w 
Defendant ) 
Defendant (having been adjudged) (entered a plea of) GUILTY to the charge of ^^ 
count NO. i 3fnfy\£:h "JoY> T-^ l^Vn*^ a Class <£L 
Count No. 2 a Class 
tyO 
Count No. 3 a Class 
Count No.4 a Class 
Misdemeanor, and no legal reason having been shown why judgment should not be pronounced, and Defendant being 
present (with) (having waived) Counsel. It is the judgment and sentence of the Court as follows: 
Count No. 1 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ —' 
less the following suspended $ 
A TOTAL TO BE PAID , , 
and to be imprisoned for ( x AatYrirvuie Cache County Jail with . .flays to oe suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 2 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 3 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended $ 
TOTAL TO BE PAID S 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Count No. 4 Defendant is fined $ plus surcharge of $ 
less the following suspended S 
TOTAL TO BE PAID $ 
and to be imprisoned for days in the Cache County Jail with days to be suspended on payment of fine. 
Stay of Execution to FRIDAY at 4:30 p.m. and the defendant is 
ordered to appear in Court at said time. Fine to be paid in installments of $ / L)(J per /^^"/prM beginning 
"5"un<—L 
Defendant may appeal this judgment within 30 days to Court of Appeal in 
Dated (Q / / / f Q 
"CIRCUIT JUDGE 
•JLO ]/\p^ns Com/numry -S^riA'c^- ^^tffe^-e. 
in 30 dcm5. 
TERRY B. CARLSEN 
Defendant in Pro Se 
720 North 400 East 
Logan, Utah 84321 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN CITY DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
TERRY B. CARLSEN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A 
NEW TRIAL 
Case No. 921000750 
COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, Terry B. Carlsen, 
and hereby respectfully moves this Honorable Court for an Order 
granting the defendant a new trial in the above-entitled matter. 
The basis for this motion for a new trial is the 
prosecutor's misconduct which violated defendant's rights to 
a fair trial and Due Process of Law under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
State v. Sullivan, 6 Utah2d 110, 307 P.2d 212 at 216 (Utah 1957). 
There was misconduct on the part of Logan City Prosecutor, Scott 
L. Wyatt because defendant in his request and supplemental request 
for discovery on file herein requested the names of all witnesses 
in which Mr. Wyatt proposed to call as witnesses at the trial in 
accordance with Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
CctSt; iSO. 
8 1993 
That as per the exhibits attached hereto, defendant was furnished 
with a witness list of all the names the prosecution intended to 
call as witnesses at trial. The names of Kirk Jones and Rob Willis 
were not included in said witness list. The prosecution had a 
subpoena issued by the Court for Kirk Jones on April 20, 1993, 
six days prior to trial. The prosecution had a subpoena issued 
by the Court for Rob Willis on the 23rd day of April, 1993, three 
days prior to trial. Both witnesses were subpoenaed to testify 
for the prosecution at a trial held on April 26, 1993. Both 
witnesses testified at said trial as to matters which were not 
relevant to the charges as per the Information filed against the 
defendant and such testimony was inadmissible under Rule 402 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Both witnesses1 testimony relating 
to other crimes, wrongs or acts was inadmissible under Rule 404 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence- The prosecutor acting in bad faith 
offered such testimony which he knew was incompetent and objectionabl 
for the ulterior purpose of informing the jury that such evidence 
may exist and for the sole purpose to prejudice the jury. The 
defendant should therefore be granted a new trial. 
DATED this / y 1 ? - — day of June, 1993. 
-2-
IN THE FIRST CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF CACHE, LOGAN DEPARTMENT 
LOGAN CITY * 
Plaintiff * ORDER DENYING 
VS * NEW TRIAL 
TERRY B. CARLSEN * Case # 921000750 
Defendant * 
A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL was filed in this Court on June 8, 1993. A 
hearing on that motion was held June 22, 1993, after which the motion was 
denied. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 1993 
;r'jr i ? 
